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a b s t r a c t 
Much work has been conducted to investigate the obstacles that keep users from using mitigations 
against security and privacy threats on smartphones. By contrast, we conducted in-depth interviews 
( N = 19) to explore users’ motivations for voluntarily applying security and privacy actions on smart- 
phones. Our work focuses on analyzing intrinsic motivation in terms of psychological need fulﬁllment. 
The ﬁndings from the interview study provide ﬁrst insights on the salience of basic psychological needs 
in the context of smartphone security and privacy. They illustrate how security and privacy actions on 
smartphones are motivated by a variety of psychological needs, only one of them being the need for 
Security . We further conducted an online survey ( N = 70) in which we used questionnaires on psycho- 
logical need fulﬁllment from the literature. The online survey is a ﬁrst attempt to quantify psychological 
need fulﬁllment for security and privacy actions on smartphones. Whereas the results of the interview 
study indicate that Security and other needs play a role as motivators for employing security and privacy 
actions on smartphones, the online study does not support the need for Security as an outstanding mo- 
tivator. Instead, in the online study, other needs such as Keeping the meaningful , Stimulation , Autonomy , 
and Competence show to be rather salient as motivators for security and privacy actions. Furthermore, the 
mean need fulﬁllment for security and privacy actions is in general rather low in the online survey. We 
conclude that there is scope for improvement to maximize psychological need fulﬁllment with security 
and privacy actions. In order to achieve a positive user experience with security and privacy technologies 
on smartphones, we suggest addressing additional psychological needs, beyond the need for Security , in 
the design of such technologies. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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t  1. Introduction 
Smartphones are an extensive source for positive user expe-
riences: using a smartphone allows people to stay connected, to
consume new games and media, or to “quantify themselves” with
ﬁtness and health monitoring apps. 
While smartphones offer vast opportunities for positive experi-
ences, threats to users’ security and privacy emerge at the same
time. Those include malicious apps, data loss, surveillance, and
proﬁling, just to name a few. 
Related work indicates that users are concerned about many
of these threats and about their privacy on smartphones [1–3] .
To mitigate these threats there is a variety of actions users can∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: lydia.kraus@tu-berlin.de (L. Kraus), ina.wechsung@tu-berlin.de 
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2214-2126/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uake [4] . Earlier research suggests to gain further insights into
ecurity and privacy aspects from an end-user perspective by
sing experiential approaches [5,6] . In this context experience
s seen as a holistic and broad view on the matter in order to
ain a rich understanding of people’s practices and lives [6] .
ccordingly, while much work has been conducted to understand
sers’ perceptions of smartphone security and privacy in terms of
nderstanding [7] , concerns [2] , awareness [3,8] , attitudes [1] , and
eelings [9] , we suggest using an experiential approach based on
sychological needs to gain a deeper understanding of the matter. 
User eXperience (UX) is a ﬁeld of study which emerged be-
ween the mid-nineties and the turn of the millenium. In con-
rast to usability, which is mainly concerned with the functional
spects of technology usage, UX includes non-functional factors
uch as beauty and affective aspects of human-computer interac-
ion (HCI) [10] . Accordingly, UX is a multi-dimensional construct
ith a holistic view on the perceived product qualities (beyond
sability), users’ emotions, motivations, usage situations, and othernder the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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o  imensions (for a literature review of UX dimensions and study
ethods refer to [10] ). 
In the present work, we focus on the motivational dimension
f user experiences in terms of psychological need fulﬁllment. Psy-
hological needs have been suggested in several theories as an ex-
lanation for human behavior: for instance, self-determination the-
ry suggests basic psychological needs as the fundamental mecha-
ism for self-motivation [11] . Furthermore, it has been shown that
eed fulﬁllment is related to satisfying events and positive affect
12] . In the context of user experience research, Hassenzahl et al.
13] show that the main motivation to use an interactive technol-
gy is the fulﬁllment of psychological needs; a positive user expe-
ience is thus the result of need fulﬁllment [13] . 
A user for instance makes a phone call to experience the feel-
ng of being close to others (thus, the motivation would be the
ulﬁllment of the need Relatedness ), rather than for the call’s sake
example taken from Hassenzahl [14] ). Or, a user activates the pri-
acy setting in a messaging app so that the sender of the messages
annot see when a message was read. This avoids the pressure to
eply immediately to a message. In this case, the privacy setting
s used to fulﬁll the basic psychological need of Autonomy . Psycho-
ogical need fulﬁllment is a primary goal which all users have in
ommon, the instantiation of the primary goal - the experience -
s however highly context-dependent and subjective [14] . 
The goal of this work is to learn about the psychological needs
hich users intend to fulﬁll with security and privacy actions on
martphones. After detailing related work on security and privacy
ctions on smartphones, user experience, and psychological needs
n Section 2 , the interview methodology is presented in Section
 and the online survey methodology is presented in Section 4 .
he results of the interviews and the online survey are reported
n Sections 5 and 6 , respectively. We discuss the implications of
pplying the approach of psychological need fulﬁllment in the se-
urity and privacy context in Section 7 , as well as the possibilities
o use psychological needs as a design inspiration for security and
rivacy mechanisms. 
. Related work 
Much work has been conducted to describe user practices, con-
erns, and usability issues related to smartphone security and pri-
acy. Despite the known usability issues of security mechanisms,
sers report being interested in applying further such mechanisms
15] . In the following, an overview of the main security and privacy
ctions users could deploy on their smartphone is presented. Those
ctions were also covered in the interviews which were conducted
or this work. 
.1. Usability and adoption of smartphone security and privacy 
echanisms 
Scrutinizing app permissions is an indispensable action to avoid
rivacy intrusions and security issues on smartphones [4] . In the
ast, the implementation of the permission model differed be-
ween smartphone operating systems (OSes): Whereas iOS users
ere shown a permission-request as soon as an app requested the
ermission for the ﬁrst time, Android users had to accept all per-
issions or groups thereof before an app could be installed. In this
mplementation, Android permissions were diﬃcult to understand
y users; also, the permission requests were shown at an unfavor-
ble point in the decision making process, that was when the deci-
ion to install an app has already been made [7] . Several solutions
ave been suggested to increase the understanding of and the at-
ention to permissions, including improved information presenta-
ion and risk communication (cf. e.g. [16–19] ). In 2014, the Android
ermissions were grouped and their presentation was modiﬁed tonclude icons for each group. While this improved information pre-
entation, security concerns remained [20] . Android version 6.0, re-
eased in 2015, enables users to grant or not to grant single per-
issions for each app [21] . However, as of March 2016, Android
.0 still has a negligible market share (2.3%) in the studied popu-
ation [22] . Thus, the issues described above are still relevant. 
A method to protect a smartphone from unauthorized access
nd subsequent privacy intrusions or security issues is the deploy-
ent of a screen lock together with an authentication method,
uch as a password or a PIN [4] . However, unlocking a smartphone
ith an authentication mechanism is time-consuming [23] . In a
tudy of 2011, the PIN was perceived as a reliable method for pro-
ecting a mobile phone by only a quarter of users (26%) [15] . Nev-
rtheless, as of 2014, many users are using a PIN or password to
rotect their device: 66% of users in Germany use a screen lock
ith a password [24] . A viable alternative to knowledge-based au-
hentication methods are biometric methods such as Touch ID on
Phones and face unlock on Android devices [25] . Biometric meth-
ds, however, also rely on PINs or passwords for fallback authenti-
ation. 
Regarding communication, eavesdropping and interception pose 
 threat. They can be mitigated by deploying end-to-end encryp-
ion of communication (calls and/or messages) [26] . Only recently,
hatsapp, one of the most popular instant messaging services for
martphones, has announced the implementation of end-to-end
ncryption which is activated by default [27] . However, the usage
f instant messaging services is not only accompanied by the risk
f being eavesdropped, but also by the risk of privacy intrusions by
ther users. The latter can be counteracted by appropriate privacy
ettings. For instance, Rashidi and Vaniea report that many users
ctively use the privacy settings of Whatsapp - in a survey among
audi Arab users almost a third of the respondents hid their last
een notice [28] . 
Another security threat, malware, might be mitigated by an-
ivirus apps which can be easily installed for Android; how-
ver, their usefulness is questionable [29] . Likewise, the usage of
ecurity software is considered by many users as nonessential
3] . Keeping the device up-to-date is another mitigation strategy
gainst malware. However, in a case study on update installation
ehavior, many users of an Android app did not immediately in-
tall updates - a behavior which may result in security vulnerabil-
ties [30] . 
Threats may also arise from the device being unavailable due
o denial of service attacks or exhausted battery power [26] . For
ounteracting the former, a resource management solution may be
nstalled; these kind of applications are, however, diﬃcult to im-
lement [26] . A study by Chin et al. also showed that users worry
bout limited battery lifetime [1] when asked about concerns re-
ated to smartphone usage. 
Data loss due to device loss or theft can be easily mitigated by
ackups. While users are concerned about the latter threats [1] ,
ther tools to mitigate negative consequences in case of theft or
oss such as remote data wipe, device locators, and device encryp-
ion are poorly adopted [3] . This might be due to unawareness of
he existence of such features [1] . 
Chin et al. conducted a detailed study of users’ practices on
martphones and their perception of security and privacy [1] : they
ound that users worry about the threats of physical theft or dam-
ge, data loss and insuﬃcient back up, malicious apps and wire-
ess network attackers, limited battery lifetime, and signal strength.
sers’ practices to protect from those threats may however have
imited effectiveness. In some cases users deduce trust indications
rom indicators not meant as such. For instance, much value is
ut on other users’ reviews in the app repository [1] . In a qualita-
ive study, Kraus et al. investigated which threats and mitigations
n smartphones are known to users and how they perceive them:
36 L. Kraus et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 34 (2017) 34–45 
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c  users reported different f eelings including social pressure, helpless-
ness, dependency, and fatalism [9] . The authors suggest that the
reasons for those negative feelings may be grounded in a lack of
psychological need fulﬁllment. Nevertheless, in their study, the use
of self-reported mitigations was related to positive feelings such as
trust and feelings of being able to exercise control [9] . Note that
the actual and perceived security of what users consider to be a
mitigation can vary greatly and will not be discussed at this point.
Related work suggests that users worry about threats to their
security and privacy on smartphones and that many users are will-
ing to adopt mitigations. However, usability shortcomings of miti-
gation technologies on smartphones and users’ mixed feelings re-
garding threats and mitigations call for an approach that focuses
on new methods to enable positive user experiences when apply-
ing security and privacy actions. 
2.2. Experiential approach to security and privacy 
The necessity to include principles from user experience re-
search into the design of security and privacy technologies has
been recognized before. For example, Bødker et al. suggest that ex-
periential approaches should be used to understand user behavior
in the IT-security domain [ 5 , p. 54]: “In daily life, people rarely
do activities solely for the purpose of security. Instead, most IT-
security decisions are part of other activities with other purposes.
When analyzing these use situations it is impossible to isolate IT-
security tasks or decisions.” Hence, security is dependent on con-
text and usage motives, and not only on a secure device and the
implemented security procedures [5] . By gaining an understanding
of users’ motivation in terms of psychological needs, the present
studies sheds lights on this issue. 
Dunphy et al. [6] note that experience design faces a spe-
cial challenge when it comes to security and privacy applications:
within those applications two kinds of users need to be taken
into account – the target user and the adversary; moreover, a user
might switch between being a targeted person and being an ad-
versary depending on the context. For example, users can become
adversaries when they start intruding the privacy of people with
whom they interact in social networks. Gaining an understanding
of target users’ motivation in terms of psychological needs could
also help to explain these kinds of situations. 
2.3. Psychological needs 
In their work on satisfying life events, Sheldon et al. deﬁne
psychological needs as “particular qualities of experience that all
people require to thrive” [ 12 , p. 325]. However, they also note
that so far there is no consensus about what those needs are.
As a consequence, they investigated 10 psychological needs from
well-known theories of psychological need fulﬁllment (such as
Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory [31] , Epstein’s cognitive-
experiential self-theory [32] ) regarding their relationship to posi-
tive life events. They found that Self-esteem , Autonomy , Relatedness
and Competence are the most salient needs in the context of satis-
fying life events. Their results were shown to be stable over time
and across cultures. 
Hassenzahl [14] took up the needs suggested by Sheldon et al.
[12] and related them to a model of user experience. Thereby, psy-
chological needs are used to describe classes of experiences [14] .
This is done by considering different types of goals that underlie
an action; do-goals and be-goals are differentiated [14] . Do-goals
are derived from higher-level be-goals that are the fulﬁllment of
an underlying need. A user, for instance, makes a phone call to
experience the feeling of being close to others. Thus, the be-goal
is feeling close to others (i.e. the fulﬁllment of the need Related-
ness ). The do-goal is the action of making the call (example takenrom Hassenzahl [14] ). The fulﬁllment of psychological needs (the
e-goal) leads to a positive user experience [13] . 
While psychological needs serve to describe motivational as-
ects and thus allow for making interpretations of users’ behavior,
hey can also serve as an inspiration for product design [14,33] .
tudies show that need fulﬁllment can be manipulated through
roduct features leading to a positive change in user experience
valuations [33,34] . Also, users’ judgement of a system’s hedonic
uality, i.e. quality aspects beyond the functional, is inﬂuenced by
eed fulﬁllment [14] . However, this depends on the attribution, i.e.
he degree to which users deem the product responsible for the
xperience [14] . 
The studies presented in this work are based on the needs as
eﬁned in Sheldon et al. [12] . The usefulness of this set of needs
n the context of HCI has previously been shown by Hassenzahl
t al. [13] . Fronemann and Peissner [33] also build upon a set of
sychological needs deﬁned by Sheldon et al. [12] and Reiss [35] .
n additional need they deﬁne, which is not covered by the def-
nitions of Sheldon et al. [12] , is Keeping the meaningful [33] . This
eed was also included into the present studies. In the following,
eﬁnitions of the psychological needs which were deployed in the
resent studies are provided [ 12 , p. 339]. 
Autonomy: “Feeling like you are the cause of your own actions
ather than feeling that external forces or pressures are the cause of
our actions.”
Competence: “Feeling that you are very capable and effective in
our actions rather than feeling incompetent or ineffective.”
Relatedness: “Feeling that you have regular intimate contact with
eople who care about you rather than feeling lonely and uncared
or.”
Self-actualization: “Feeling that you are developing your best po-
entials and making life meaningful rather than feeling stagnant and
hat life does not have much meaning.”
Security: “Feeling safe and in control of your life rather than feel-
ng uncertain and threatened by your circumstances.”
Popularity: “Feeling that you are liked, respected, and have in-
uence over others rather than feeling like a person whose advice or
pinions nobody is interested in.”
Money/Luxury: “Feeling that you have plenty of money to buy
ost of what you want rather than feeling like a poor person who
as no nice possessions.”
Physical/Bodily: “Feeling that your body is healthy and well-taken
are of rather than feeling out of shape or unhealthy.”
Self-esteem: “Feeling that you are a worthy person who is as
ood as anyone else rather than feeling like a ‘loser’ .”
Stimulation: “Feeling that you get plenty of enjoyment and plea-
ure rather than feeling bored and understimulated by life.”
Keeping the meaningful: “Collecting meaningful things” [33] /
saving” [35] 
. Interview methodology 
Following the description of be-goals and do-goals, psycholog-
cal needs are related to the question why something is done
hereas actions are related to the question what is done and how
t is done [14] . Therefore the script for the semi-structured in-
epth interviews concerned the following research questions: 
• Which security and privacy actions are employed by smart-
phone users? (What?) 
• How are they employed? (How?) 
• Why are they employed? (Why?) 
The interview script has been published in [36] . With this ap-
roach participants were not explicitly asked for the needs they
im to fulﬁll with their actions. Therefore, the why-questions were
onsidered to provide answers regarding the reasons for doing an
L. Kraus et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 34 (2017) 34–45 37 
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Table 1 
Self-reported security and privacy actions. Percentages do not sum up to 100 
as participants could report several actions. 
Security and privacy actions Freq. % 
Save battery lifetime 18 95% 
Switch off all data connections (e.g. by ﬂight-mode) 17 89% 
Deploy updates 16 84% 
Protect from theft (e.g. by securely storing the device) 14 74% 
Check permissions 14 74% 
Make backups 14 74% 
Use screen lock with authentication 12 63% 
Avoid ﬁnancial apps/ functions (e.g. online banking) 10 53% 
Check monthly bill/ prepaid balance 9 47% 
Disable WiFi connection 6 32% 
Disable Bluetooth 5 26% 
Disable GPS 4 21% 
Hide one’s identify (e.g. by fake user proﬁles) 4 21% 
Reduce online “data traces” 3 16% 
Adjust privacy settings of messaging apps 3 16% 
Use antivirus apps 3 16% 
Log out from services 3 16% 
Take out insurance 3 16% 
Use remote management apps 3 16% 
Do not use messaging apps 2 11% 
Use apps for privacy protection/ permission management 2 11% 
Use messaging apps with end-to-end encryption 2 11% 
Modify privacy settings of the device 1 5% 
Uninstall pre-installed apps 1 5% 
Root the device 1 5% 
Do not download apps at all 1 5% 
Use data/ device encryption 0 0% 
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Tction and those reasons were then coded with the psychological
eeds. 
The interview script covered a variety of possible actions, ex-
racted from the literature on smartphone security risks [4,26] and
sers’ threat perception [1] . Action-questions were intentionally
esigned in an open manner as it could not be assumed that users
nly stick to the actions which are deﬁned in the literature. The
alience of the topics security and privacy increased during the
ourse of the interview. 
The interview was divided into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, par-
icipants were asked about their general smartphone usage habits,
.g. reasons why they bought a smartphone, which operating sys-
em they use, and if they have used another operating system be-
ore. They were then asked about smartphone sharing and usage at
ork. Afterwards, several questions on app usage, app installing,
nd uninstalling were asked. Some of the questions were taken
rom Chin et al. [1] . 
In the second part of the interviews, the central themes were
ecurity and privacy actions, including questions about the ﬁrst
ime that participants set up their smartphone, usage of data con-
ections, installing of updates, usage of pre- and postpaid options,
attery consumption, theft protection, backups, internet usage, ﬁ-
ancial functions, protection from app access to sensitive informa-
ion and communication. 
In the third part, questions covered security and privacy soft-
are usage, password lock usage, and thoughts on general threats
f smartphone usage. For each question of the interview, the inter-
iewers were instructed to ask follow-up questions on reasons and
riggers for behavior. 
.1. Procedure 
The interviews were conducted in German in the beginning of
015 at the Quality and Usability Lab of Technische Universität
erlin. Each interview was conducted by one interviewer. To re-
uce interviewer effects, there were two interviewers. Approxi-
ately half of the interviews were conducted by Interviewer 1, the
ther half by Interviewer 2. Audio recordings were made to enable
erbatim transcription after the interviews. The audio recordings
ere deleted after the transcription process. The sessions took be-
ween 20 and 40 min depending on how talkative the participants
ere. Participants received 12 € reimbursement. At the beginning of
he interview, participants received an information sheet and were
sked for consent. Then, questions on demographics, smartphone
sage (frequency of use, etc.), privacy concern and ICT attitudes
ere presented to the participants. During the recruitment it was
ot mentioned that the interview is about security and privacy, but
he participants were told that the study is about their smartphone
sage habits. 
At the end of the interviews the participants were thanked and
ebriefed. Due to the nature of the interview it might have been
hat the participants became aware of shortcomings in their se-
urity behavior. Therefore, after the interview, they were provided
ith a ﬂyer on which they could ﬁnd further information on how
o protect their security and privacy on smartphones. 
.2. Analysis 
The codebook consisted of the descriptions of the 11 psycholog-
cal needs (cf. Section 2 ), the items of the need fulﬁllment ques-
ionnaire [12] , and a few items of the UNEEQ questionnaire (only
or Keeping the meaningful ) [37] . Thus, the codes could be used for
ither need fulﬁllment or frustration. 
Two coders independently coded the interviews by applying
he codebook described above. Interrater-agreement between the
wo coders was found to be moderate (Cohen’s κ = 0.46) accordingo Landis and Koch [38] . The disagreements between the coders
temmed from a few issues. During the coding, the coders encoun-
ered many passages in which participants told that they would
o an action in order to save money. However, saving money is
ot explicitly part of the deﬁnition of the need Money/Luxury as
escribed in Section 2 . Nevertheless, in most passages related to
aving money, participants were willing to corrupt their privacy
r security in order to get access to “nice possessions”. For in-
tance, they said that they would choose the free version of an
pp rather than the paid version, although the free version re-
uired more permissions. Thus after discussion, the coders decided
o label these passages as Money/Luxury . The coders also discussed
he Security code. This code was rather found in the context of
eing safe from threats than having a need for structure or control .
he coders agreed that the ﬁrst deﬁnition is valid as it can be
ound in the questionnaire on need fulﬁllment [12] . There was also
isagreement on whether situations in which the participants re-
orted the desire that others cannot track or observe them should
e coded as Security or Autonomy . This is a typical situation re-
ated to privacy; however, a need for privacy is not part of the
eeds suggested in the related literature (cf. Section 2 ). In the end,
he coders agreed on coding these passages as Autonomy – in line
ith Westin’s deﬁnition of the functions of privacy, one of them
eing personal autonomy [39] . In the following, the coded tran-
cripts upon which the coders ﬁnally agreed are used. 
Additionally to the analysis of the psychological needs, a list of
ecurity and privacy actions was extracted from the data by the
oders. Actions in the list include actions as deﬁned in the litera-
ure [4,26] and actions which were additionally mentioned by the
articipants. Based on this list, the coders analyzed independently
hether an action was applied by a participant or not. For the
oding of the actions, the coders reached almost perfect interrater-
greement (Cohen’s κ = 0.84) according to Landis and Koch [38] .
he coders met to discuss disagreements and to reach consent.
able 1 reports the results upon which the coders agreed. 
38 L. Kraus et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 34 (2017) 34–45 
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s  3.3. Participants 
Nineteen smartphone users (10 female) were recruited from a
panel of Technische Universität Berlin. The age ranged from 18 to
58 years with a mean of 31 years. Participants had diverse educa-
tional levels (approximately equally distributed between secondary
school degree, qualiﬁcation for university entrance, and university
degree). The sample comprised nine employees, seven students
and three job seekers. 
3.4. Smartphone usage 
There were 13 Android users, ﬁve iPhone users and one Win-
dows Phone user. The sample roughly reﬂects the distribution of
smartphone operating systems among the smartphone user popu-
lation in Germany at the time of the study (Android 70%, iOS 20%,
Windows Phone 5%) [40] . Smartphone usage experience among the
participants was diverse: Four participants had owned their smart-
phone for less than a year, seven for one to three years and eight
for more than three years. Most of the participants use their smart-
phone at least once per hour ( N = 15). Only one participant had a
professional IT background. 
4. Online study methodology 
For the online survey, those security and privacy actions were
selected which participants either frequently reported in the inter-
views or which were considered to be of interest for security and
privacy technologies designers (e.g. messaging with end-to-end en-
cryption). General need fulﬁllment was measured for each of those
actions. 
4.1. Procedure 
Participants for the online study were recruited by word of
mouth and email. They were recruited by seven people who sent
out emails to people who they know but who were not aware of
the study’s topic. As the survey took around 20 min to answer,
we preferred sending personalized invitations as we expected
to achieve higher compliance of the participants and eventually
higher data quality. Three vouchers à 50 € were raﬄed among all
participants. 
The survey started with questions on demographics. Afterwards,
data on smartphone usage was collected: for how long the smart-
phone has been used, frequency of use, the operating system, their
three favorite apps, the reasons for buying a smartphone, and
whether they perceive different situations as threats. The survey
was then divided in three different versions. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the different versions of the survey. 
Version 1 : Participants were asked if they apply backups and if
there are situations in which their data connections are disabled
(one question each for WiFi, Bluetooth, and GPS) and, if so, how
often they disable them. The last question was whether they apply
a password or PIN lock. 
Version 2 : Participants were asked if they install updates, if so,
manually or automatic. They were also asked if they check their
monthly bill and prepaid balance, respectively. Then they should
indicate if they apply privacy settings (i.e. whether they have en-
abled the function that others can see if a message was read)
within messaging apps. 
Version 3 : Participants were asked if they do something to pro-
tect their phone from theft, if so, they were asked what. They
were then asked if they check app permissions, if so, how often.
At the end they were asked whether they use messaging apps with
end-to-end encryption. As it could not be assumed that all partic-
ipants are familiar with the term end-to-end encryption, examplesf such apps were given. Furthermore, participants were also of-
ered an option allowing them to specify other apps than the ones
iven. 
For each action, participants were asked to indicate the level
f need fulﬁllment they experienced. To do so, a German version
f the need fulﬁllment questionnaire [41] was employed which is
ased on the questionnaire by Sheldon et al. [12] . Questions for
eeping the meaningful were taken from the UNeeQ questionnaire
33,37] . For participants who stated that they do a particular ac-
ion, the questions were formulated like this: “By doing [action] I
ave the feeling that…”; for non-user the wording was: “By not
oing [action] I have the feeling that…”
The reasons for splitting the survey in three parts were twofold.
irst, as participants were supposed to answer the need question-
aire for each action, considering all actions for all participants
ould have led to a high number of need items per participant
9 actions × 3 items per need × 8 needs = 216 items). Second, the
uestionnaire would have been highly repetitive as participants
ould have needed to answer nine times the same 24 need items
only differing in the action they relate to). These two factors may
ave resulted in fatigue effects and lower motivation to retrieve
he optimal answer to each questions (i.e. “optimizing” [42] ). 
Besides splitting the survey in three parts, only two of the three
tems of the original need questionnaires were selected. This fur-
her reduced the number of items and resulted in 48 need items
n total per participant (16 items per action). The needs for Self-
ctualization, Self-esteem and Physical/Bodily were excluded, as
hey were reported only seldom in the interviews. 
Besides questions on security and privacy actions, which dif-
ered between the three versions, all questions were the same for
ll participants. 
.2. Participants 
The participants (female = 37.1%) of the online study were be-
ween 18 and 61 years old, with an average of 28 years. They had
iverse educational levels (Secondary school degree: 4.3%, com-
leted training: 12.9%,high school degree: 32.9%, College/ university
egree: 50%). Occupational groups were reported to be employees
38.6%) and undergraduate students (44.3%), and other groups (e.g.
ob seekers, self-employed) (17.2%). The majority did not have pro-
essional IT expertise (60%). 
.3. Smartphone usage 
Among the participants were 40 Android users (57.1%), 23 iOS
sers (32.9%), four Windows Phone users (5.7%) and three users
f other mobile operating systems (4.3%). The majority has owned
heir smartphone for more than three years (61.4%) or between one
nd three years (32.9%), while only few participants reported to
aving owned their smartphone between four and twelve months
5.7%). Most of the participants were frequent smartphone users:
0% reported to use their smartphones several times per hour, 20%
eported to use it approximately once per hour, and 24.3% reported
o use it several times a day. 
The sample was diverse regarding age, smartphone operating
ystem usage, and occupational groups; however, there was a bias
owards male participants, higher educational levels, and students.
. Interview results 
Participants reported the application of many security and pri-
acy actions in the interviews. Those actions largely rely on either
indfulness or pre-installed mechanisms. The psychological needs
otivating the application of the reported actions are diverse: be-
ides Security which was likely to be a motivator due to the na-
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sure of the interview, Autonomy and Money/Luxury play a major
ole. Competence , Relatedness , and Stimulation were found to be of
oderate importance. Keeping the meaningful and Popularity were
nly relevant for a few actions. Self-actualization , Physical/Bodily ,
nd Self-esteem were found to play a minor role as motivators. 
The results of the interviews are structured according to the
acro-structure of the interview script. For each subsection, the
wo to three most mentioned needs are discussed. 
.1. Security and privacy actions 
An overview of the reported actions is provided in Table 1 .
aving battery lifetime was reported most frequently, followed by
witching off all data connections, deploying updates, and protect-
ng the device from theft. 
Neither the installation of nor the subscription to additional
pps or services is required for the 10 top strategies as those
trategies are either based on mindfulness or on pre-installed se-
urity/privacy mechanisms. Examples for the latter include screen
ock with authentication or backups to the cloud (if the backup
pp was pre-installed). 
Note that actions encompass what the participants have re-
orted, not what they may actually use. For example, iPhone users
ay not have been aware that encryption on iOS is enabled by de-
ault when using a screen lock with authentication. Further note,
hat end-to-end encryption was not implemented in many mes-
aging apps by the time of the study. Thus, the use of messaging
pps with end-to-end encryption was interpreted as a separate ac-
ion. Table 1 does not take into account intensity and frequency
f the deployed actions. For example, for “checking permissions”
here may be participants who check app permissions every time,
hile other participants may only check them when they are sus-
icious for some reason. 
In the following we report the psychological needs related to
he different actions. The abbreviations P1 to P19 thereby indicate
he different participants. 
.2. Saving battery lifetime 
From an IT-security perspective the (automatic) monitoring of
attery consumption may be used to detect malicious activities on
 device [26] . While users could also regularly check their battery
tatus to detect apps that unnecessarily drain energy, the partici-
ants in the interview study mentioned checking their battery sta-
us as a safety measure: they reported saving battery lifetime to
e, for example, available to friends. Thus, Relatedness is one reason
or saving battery lifetime. P12 mentioned that he started to check
is battery status regularly as there have been situations where “I
as somehow absentminded and my battery only had 30%, but I
as somewhere outside for let’s say ﬁve or six hours; well, I need
o be available to friends or so.”
Another reason for saving battery lifetime is Security , as evident
n the statement by P9: “Mhm well, in fact […] it happens quite
ften, that I need to ﬁnd my way home via Google Maps or public
ransport and therefore I always want to have at least 10% battery
eft and that’s why… that’s why I save battery”. 
.3. Connectivity 
When participants were asked about situations in which their
ata connections such as Bluetooth, NFC or GPS are disabled, we
xpected that they report on turning off WiFi for example in order
o avoid network attacks. Instead, most of the participants men-
ioned situations in which they switch off all data connections (e.g.
y activating the ﬂight mode). This behavior is driven by the need
or Autonomy : “I don’t need to be available all the time, well, I cane without my mobile phone” (P11). “Because I want to be left
lone” (P9). “I always disabled it [all data connections] at work,
o that I don’t get distracted” (P15). Money/Luxury is another rea-
on why data connections are switched off. P17 noted: “[…] when
 am at home then I use WiFi and switch off my mobile internet,
ecause I think I can save some of my data contingent doing so at
east that is how I understood it.” However, for few participants,
 need for Security was found related to the usage of public WiFi
pots: “Well, for me that is… open WiFi is too risky for me.” (P15)
.4. Updates 
Updates were seen as a source for Stimulation rather than a ne-
essity in terms of Security , for instance by P8: “Yes, if there are
ew updates I install them so that I have the latest version [of an
pp].” Doing updates manually provides Autonomy for some of the
articipants: “In certain intervals, maybe once per month, I enter
oogle Play and then I check which apps I have [on my phone] and
or which of those apps updates are needed. Then I decide what I
pdate or what I don’t update” (P2). 
.5. Protection from theft 
Interestingly, instead of using remote management apps or the
ike, many of the participants mentioned that they store their de-
ice securely or that they pay attention to where they leave the
evice. This provides them with a feeling of Security , as can be
een in the quote by P15: “It’s always strange, when it [the phone]
s somewhere else, for example in my backpack; I’d rather carry it
n me, then I know it’s there and I notice relatively quickly if it
ould be gone.” P12 stated: “I just do it [storing it securely] as a
reventive measure, just not to be placed in such a situation [that
he phone is stolen].”
.6. Screen lock with authentication 
Not surprisingly, most quotes related to screen locks with au-
hentication were coded with Security , an example is the follow-
ng quote by P8: “Uumh, if it [the phone] is stolen or so, [for the
hief] it wouldn’t be so easy to use it immediately.” P6 noted as a
eason to use password lock: “I believe that it’s maybe… In case
hat one loses the phone, it is a bit more diﬃcult [to access it].”
ecurity and Popularity as reasons to adopt a password lock were
entioned by P5: “In the beginning it was, because I thought it is
retty cool how my friends typed in their security codes on their
obile phone. Now it is just for security reasons.” Thus, for P5
ocking mechanisms have the potential to convey the impression
f being “cool” to others. 
.7. App selection, uninstalling apps and mitigating access to 
ensitive information 
When it comes to app selection Stimulation plays a major role
s noted by P11: “sometimes I check the category ‘newest apps’
nd those that sound interesting will be downloaded.” Also, the
nﬂuence of the price, i.e. Money/Luxury , was mentioned by sev-
ral participants, for instance in this quote: “Well, there are enough
apps] for free” (P17). 
Security may be a decision factor in the app selection process,
s noted by P3: “It depends on what kind of app it is, how urgent
o I need that app? Well, if I want to download some game just
or fun and [then I] see ‘Okay, the App wants to have access to ev-
rything’, […] than I just dont install it.” P4 mentions Security con-
erns during app selection: “[…] but then sometimes I do worry, a
elf-employed developer, what kind of mischief they could do.”
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FA feeling of not being competent when it comes to judging per-
missions was expressed by P7: “Therefore I don’t see myself in the
position, to switch those things [the permissions] off; I think that
I am allowing it [having access] to some apps.”
Autonomy is experienced by not allowing apps to access loca-
tion data “[I switch off GPS] because I do not want, that someone
who should not know it, knows where I am.” (P11). When it comes
to uninstalling apps, Autonomy is a reason, as evident from this
statement by P12: “Simply because I don’t want Apple to know
where I am or something like that”. However, also Money/Luxury
may be a reason for uninstalling an app: “Well, sometimes there
are apps which are advertised to be free of charge and then you
only got a couple of functions and you have to pay for many other
functions. And well then I rather uninstall those apps because it
annoys me.” (P13). 
5.8. Backups 
Security and Keeping the meaningful were the only reasons that
were salient in the context of backups: “Yes, because the data on
my mobile phone is important to me… and well it is better…
safety comes ﬁrst.” (P8). Unsurprisingly, the desire to keep (mean-
ingful) things is related to the subjective value that the participants
attach to them, as implied by this statement by P3: “Well, I am a
person who loses his mobile phone quite often, and, well I was in
Brazil and took some pictures there. And after two weeks of trav-
eling I dropped my mobile phone in a river. Well, then I thought
‘mhh damn it’ . I got my phone to work again, but then I uploaded
everything to the cloud well, so that I do not lose all my pictures
[…].”
5.9. Communication 
Being in contact with people one cares about, i.e. Relatedness ,
was mentioned by many of the participants as a reason for using
messaging apps: “The reason for using it [WhatsApp] is actually
that all my friends are using it, otherwise I would like to use an-
other one [app].” (P9). “Because everyone used to use it and if you
did write an SMS, then you were kind of out and well then you
just used it too. Last year I tried to get rid of WhatsApp, but there
are still too many people who still got it and won’t write SMS and
well then you just have to get back to WhatsApp.” (P15). 
When the participants were asked whether they do something
in order to protect their communication, we expected that they
would mention end-to-end encryption or the like. However, only
two participants reported that they used it. Instead many said
that they use privacy settings in messaging apps. Those statements
were labeled with Autonomy : “I wouldnt describe it as a protection
measure, but for WhatsApp I turned off, that you can see when I
was online the last time or stuff like that… well.” (P3). Group chats
in messaging apps were seen as a possible source of unpleasant
consequences by P6: “Yes, so, I am careful when it comes to these
group… group-chats or things like that. I do not use them, because
I think they are quite precarious […].” Therefore, this quote was
coded with Security . 
Summarizing, we found a variety of examples how psychologi-
cal needs, i.e. be-goals, drive security and privacy actions on smart-
phones: for instance, the participants reported Relatedness and Se-
curity as motivators for saving battery lifetime; they further re-
ported that Autonomy , Money/Luxury , and Security are playing a
role in managing connectivity; they also mentioned that Stimula-
tion and Autonomy motivate actions related to updates and that the
need for Security motivates the protection from theft; Security was
mainly mentioned as motivator for using a screen lock with au-
thentication, however, there is also a potential for Popularity being
addressed with this action. App selection was noted to be driveny Stimulation and Money/Luxury , whereas Security , Competence (or
 lack thereof) and Autonomy were reported to be related to unin-
talling apps and mitigating access to sensitive information. The in-
erviews further indicated that backups are motivated by Keeping
he meaningful and the need for Security ; communication is related
o Relatedness , whereas its protection is related to Autonomy , and
ecurity , both rather in the context of threats arising from other
sers. 
. Online study results 
In this section the results of the online survey are reported. We
eport the results for those security and privacy actions which we
onsider to be most inﬂuenceable by security and privacy technol-
gy designers. 
Whereas Security was a salient need in the interviews, the on-
ine survey results do not suggest Security to be of special impor-
ance as a motivator. The online study results rather suggest that
ther needs such as Keeping the meaningful , Stimulation , Autonomy ,
nd Competence play a role for some of the actions. For other ac-
ions, the results were inconclusive. Although differences in need
ulﬁllment were found for some of the actions, general need fulﬁll-
ent for all actions was rather low according to the mean values
hich were mostly below 3.0 
Table 2 shows the mean values, medians and standard devia-
ions for the respective security and privacy actions. As the survey
as split into three parts and as only users who reported to take
n action were considered, the sample size ( N ) for each action is
ather small. Fig. 1 shows the need proﬁles in terms of mean need
ulﬁllment for each action. 
As the sample size for each action was rather small, non-
arametric Friedman tests (i.e. the non-parametric equivalent of
 repeated measures ANOVA) were conducted for each action to
ee whether users rank some needs higher than others. Post-hoc
nalyses were conducted with adjusted p-values using the Bonfer-
oni method (i.e. the p -values were multiplied with the number of
omparisons and only accepted as signiﬁcant if they were still be-
ow 0.05). Effect sizes ( r ) were calculated for post-hoc analyses as
 = Z / sqrt ( O ) with O being the number of observations [43] . 
.1. Backups 
For participants who reported to do backups ( N = 14), the Fried-
an test revealed a signiﬁcant difference in need fulﬁllment for
his action, χ2 = 40.90, p < 0.01. Post-hoc analysis showed that
sers ranked Keeping the meaningful signiﬁcantly higher than Pop-
larity , Z = 3.16, p = 0.04, r = 0.60. Keeping the meaningful was fur-
her ranked signiﬁcantly higher than Stimulation , Z = 3.74, p < 0.01,
 = 0.71, and Money/Luxury , Z = 4.13, p < 0.01, r = 0.78. For all pair-
ise comparisons effect sizes are large. The results suggest that
he fulﬁllment of Keepings the meaningful is a relevant factor to use
ackups (cf. also Fig. 1 (a)). 
.2. Updates 
For participants who reported that they installed updates
 N = 22), the Friedman test indicated signiﬁcant differences be-
ween the level of need fulﬁllment, χ2 = 30.00, p < 0.01. Post-
oc analysis showed that values for Stimulation were signiﬁcantly
igher than for Money/ Luxury , Z = 3.85, p < 0.01, r = 0.58. The effect
ize for the pairwise comparison is large. The results suggest that
timulation is a rather relevant factor to employ updates (cf. also
ig. 1 (b)). 
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Table 2 
Mean (M), median (Md.) and standard deviation (SD) values for need fulﬁllment by security and privacy action. Highest mean and median value for each ac- 
tion in bold. AUT = Autonomy; COMP = Competence; STIM = Stimulation; MON = Money/ Luxury; SEC = Security; POP = Popularity; KTM = Keeping the meaningful; 
REL = Relatedness. 
Need Backups Updates Scrutinizing permissions Password lock Privacy settings Encrypted messaging 
M Md. SD M Md. SD M Md. SD M Md. SD M Md. SD M Md. SD 
AUT 1.71 1.50 0.89 2.05 1.25 1.25 2.31 2.00 1.10 2.04 1.75 1.06 2.59 3.00 1.00 2.12 1.50 1.33 
COMP 1.96 2.00 0.84 1.89 1.50 1.09 2.14 2.00 0.78 1.82 1.00 1.12 1.73 1.50 0.82 1.96 1.50 1.23 
STIM 1.36 1.00 0.60 2.36 1.75 1.33 1.28 1.00 0.55 1.39 1.00 0.74 1.77 1.00 1.15 1.77 1.00 1.24 
MON 1.14 1.00 0.36 1.39 1.00 0.83 1.28 1.00 0.60 1.14 1.00 0.53 1.55 1.00 1.29 1.50 1.00 1.19 
SEC 2.21 2.00 1.19 2.14 2.00 1.28 1.67 1.00 1.03 1.71 1.50 0.91 1.55 1.00 0.82 2.38 3.00 1.45 
POP 1.50 1.00 0.76 1.73 1.00 0.98 1.39 1.00 0.78 1.21 1.00 0.58 2.09 2.00 1.30 1.62 1.00 1.26 
KTM 3.04 3.50 1.34 1.70 1.25 0.85 1.47 1.00 0.74 1.64 1.25 0.84 1.73 1.00 1.03 1.96 1.00 1.42 
REL 1.68 1.00 1.08 1.80 1.00 1.20 1.22 1.00 0.57 1.32 1.00 0.72 1.86 1.00 1.10 2.50 3.00 1.34 
1
2
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AUT
COMP
STIM
MON
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POP
KTM
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(a) Backups: Mean need fulfillment
1
2
3
4
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(b) Updates: Mean need fulfillment
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(c) Scrutinizing permissions:
Mean need fulfillment
1
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(d) Screenlock with authentication:
Mean need fulfillment
1
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AUT
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STIM
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(e) Privacy settings (instant messaging):
Mean need fulfillment
1
2
3
4
5
AUT
COMP
STIM
MON
SEC
POP
KTM
REL
(f) End-to-end encrypted messaging:
Mean need fulfillment
Fig. 1. Mean need fulﬁllment for different actions. The subﬁgures show distinct need proﬁles for each action. AUT = Autonomy; COMP = Competence; STIM = Stimulation; 
MON = Money/ Luxury; SEC = Security; POP = Popularity; KTM = Keeping the meaningful; REL = Relatedness. 
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s  6.3. App permissions 
For participants who reported to scrutinize permissions
( N = 18), the Friedman test was signiﬁcant, χ2 = 58.89, p < 0.01.
Post-hoc analysis showed that users rated Autonomy signiﬁcantly
higher than Relatedness , Z = 3.61, p < 0.01, r = 0.60, Money/ Luxury ,
Z = 3.91, p < 0.01, r = 0.65, Stimulation , Z = 3.71, p < 0.01, r = 0.62,
and Popularity , Z = 3.20, p = 0.039, r = 0.53. Also, users ranked Com-
petence signiﬁcantly higher than Relatedness , Z = 3.50, p = 0.013,
r = 0.58, Money/Luxury , Z = 3.81, p < 0.01, r = 0.64, and Stimulation ,
Z = 3.61, p < 0.01, r = 0.60. For all pairwise comparisons effect sizes
are large. As the permission systems differ depending on the OS,
Android and iOS users were compared: a Mann-Whitney- U Test
did not reveal signiﬁcant differences. The results suggest that scru-
tinizing permissions is related to the fulﬁllment of the needs for
Autonomy and Competence (cf. also Fig. 1 (c)). Interestingly, for all
needs beside Autonomy and Competence , the median value is 1.0
(cf. Table 2 ). Thus, at least half of the participants felt that other
needs are not fulﬁlled at all. Even though participants who scru-
tinize permissions ranked Autonomy and Competence higher com-
pared to other needs, the mean and median values remain rather
low ( < 2.5) compared to the results of Hassenzahl et al. who inves-
tigated need fulﬁlment in the context of HCI [13] . 
6.4. Screenlock with authentication 
Despite a signiﬁcant difference in need fulﬁllment for partic-
ipants who reported to use a screen lock together with a PIN
or password ( N = 14, Friedman test, χ2 = 30.00, p < 0.01), post-hoc
analysis did not show signiﬁcant differences. Again, need fulﬁll-
ment was in general low with ﬁve of eight investigated needs hav-
ing a median of 1.0. The highest mean value ( Autonomy ) is only
slightly larger than 2.0 (cf. Table 2 and Fig. 1 (d)). Surprisingly, not
even Security scored higher than the other needs. 
6.5. Privacy settings in instant messaging 
The results indicate a rather high median of 3.0 for Autonomy
for users of privacy settings in instant messaging apps ( N = 11, cf.
also Table 2 and Fig. 1 (e)). However, a Friedman test did not show
signiﬁcant differences in need fulﬁllment. 
6.6. End-to-end encrypted instant messaging 
A Friedman test was signiﬁcant for users of messaging apps
with end-to-end encryption ( N = 13), χ2 = 18.78, p < 0.01; however,
post-hoc analysis did not yield signiﬁcant results. There were high
median values for Relatedness and Security indicating at least for
some of the participants a tendency for the fulﬁllment of those
needs (cf. also Fig. 1 (f)); however, the rankings for those two needs
did not differ signiﬁcantly from other needs. 
In summary, the results of the online survey suggest that for
some actions certain needs are more relevant than others. In cases
where an effect was found in the post-hoc analysis, the effect
sizes were large (above 0.5). For backup users, the results indicate
that Keeping the meaningful plays a role as a motivator. For up-
date users, Stimulation was shown to be rather important, at least
more important than Money/ Luxury . Users who reported to scru-
tinize permissions, ranked Autonomy and Competence higher than
other needs. For users of screen lock with authentication, end-to-
end encrypted instant messaging apps, and privacy settings of in-
stant messaging apps, the results were inconclusive. 
Although differences in need fulﬁllment were found for some of
the actions, general need fulﬁllment for all actions was rather low
according to the mean values which were mostly below 3.0. The
implications of this ﬁnding are discussed in Section 7.2 . . Discussion 
The interview results indicate that users apply diverse security
nd privacy actions to protect themselves from threats on their
martphones. Furthermore, the interview results illustrate how a
ariety of psychological needs drive security and privacy actions on
martphones. For some of the security and privacy actions, namely
ackups, updates, and scrutinizing permissions, the results of the
nline survey are in line with the interview results. For the oth-
rs actions (i.e. end-to-end encrypted instant messaging apps, and
rivacy settings of instant messaging apps) the results are incon-
lusive. 
.1. Limitations 
The interviews were annotated with predeﬁned concepts from
heories of psychological needs. This is a subjective process and it
ight be that some quotes could be interpreted in a different way.
he moderate interrater agreement indicates that the application
f psychological needs in the context of security and privacy on
martphones may proﬁt from further conceptualization and speci-
cation. We leave additional conceptualizations to future work for
hich the present studies provide a good starting point. 
The interview study sample consisted partly of students and job
eekers which might have led to the result that saving money was
 rather salient motive in the decision making process. Despite this
imitation, the interview sample reﬂects well the smartphone op-
rating system distribution in the studied population. 
The online survey included a lot of questions as need fulﬁllment
as collected for several security and privacy actions. By splitting
he survey in three versions and considering only users of an ac-
ion, the sample size for each action was rather small. However,
e suspect that helped to reduce possible fatigue effects. While
he sample size limits the generalizability of the results, the study
rovides ﬁrst insights into the practicability of applying the need
ulﬁllment questionnaire in the security and privacy context. 
.2. Psychological needs in the security and privacy context 
While Security was a salient need in the interviews, the online
tudy results do not suggest Security as an outstanding motivator
or security and privacy actions. A possible explanation for this dif-
erence may be the twofold deﬁnition of the need for Security : In
he interviews Security was mentioned mostly in the sense of be-
ng safe from threats and uncertainties. In the questionnaire which
as used in the online study, the Security deﬁnition is broader and
ncompasses, besides the aspect of protection, also the aspect of
outine and structure as a source for feeling secure [12,41] . While
sers might associate being safe from threats with data security
nd privacy actions, this might not be the case for the aspects re-
ated to daily routines. 
Moreover, while Security may serve as a motivator to employ
ecurity and privacy actions, the fulﬁllment of the Security need
ay not necessarily lead to a strong positive user experience: in
elated work by Hassenzahl et al., Security has been found to be
f only minor importance for positive user experiences with tech-
ology [13] . In addition, in their study, the need for Security also
howed only a low correlation with positive affect [13] . Hassen-
ahl et al. thus suggest that “Security can be understood as a ‘deﬁ-
iency need’, i.e. a need that creates negative affect if blocked, but
ot necessarily strong positive feelings if fulﬁlled” [13, p. 358]. This
s also in line with ﬁndings of Karapanos et al. [44] : In a study
n social media experiences with Whatsapp, they found that the
eed for Security was of least importance for positive experiences
ith this service. However, for negative experiences with What-
app, Security ranked second as a deprivated need [44] . Thereby,
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g  ecurity and privacy related issues such as exposing personal con-
ent to wrong addressees or unsolicited group participation in chats
ere found to be sources for negative experiences. Building on
he present ﬁndings and the ﬁndings from related work, we sug-
est that the user experience with security and privacy technolo-
ies and actions may proﬁt from designing them in such a way
hat also psychological needs beyond the need for Security are
ddressed. We discuss in Section 7.3 how different psychological
eeds could be addressed for security and privacy actions. 
Although the need for Money/Luxury was rather salient in the
nterviews, the online survey did not provide further evidence. Fur-
hermore, in related works the need for Money/Luxury has been
ound to be only of minor importance as intrinsic motivator [12] .
he difference between the interview results and the online study
ight have resulted from the fact that the need for Money/Luxury
as interpreted in the interviews to include the desire to save
oney. However, this desire could be an extrinsic motivational
actor rather than an intrinsic motivational factor (psychological
eeds are considered as intrinsic motivators). Thus, saving money
ay not lead per se to a positive user experience and may be a
ecessity rather than a reason. 
During the analysis of the psychological needs in the interviews,
 number of assumptions regarding their interpretation have been
ade. The desire for privacy has been interpreted as being related
o Autonomy . The online survey results partly support this notion:
or users who scrutinize permissions they indicate that Autonomy
nd Competence play a major role as motivators. However, for the
se of privacy settings in messaging apps the results do not sug-
est that Autonomy is an outstanding need. 
Pedersen [45] and Westin [39] suggest that there is a variety of
rivacy behaviors which are driven by different privacy functions
uch as autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited
nd protected communication [39] . We suspect that including fur-
her privacy functions (besides Autonomy ) will lead to a better con-
eptualization of psychological needs in the context of security and
rivacy research. We plan to conduct further studies to investigate
ow the functions deﬁned by Westin and Pedersen can be inte-
rated into the concept of psychological needs. 
In comparison to results found in related work, need fulﬁllment
n the online study was rather low (most mean values were below
.0). For example, for satisfying life events, Sheldon et al. report
ean values of need fulﬁllment between 2.4 and 4.1 [12] ; in the
ontext of technology usage, Hassenzahl et al. observed values be-
ween 2.9 and 3.3 [13] . A possible explanation is that, in contrast
o Sheldon et al. [12] and Hassenzahl et al. [13] , participants were
ot asked in the present studies to report on outstanding positive
r negative experiences related to the studied topic (i.e. security
nd privacy actions in this case). 
On the other hand, the results may also suggest that need ful-
llment for security and privacy actions is in general low. This
onsequently encourages new approaches to design security and
rivacy actions in such a way that need fulﬁllment is maximized.
ow psychological need fulﬁllment can be included into the design
f security and privacy technologies, is discussed in the following. 
.3. Psychological needs as design inspiration 
Addressing different psychological needs in security and privacy
echnologies for smartphones creates a new design space for posi-
ive user experiences with such technologies. In the following, ex-
mples of how security and privacy technologies that support psy-
hological need fulﬁllment could look like are provided. 
.3.1. Authentication 
We suggest improving the user experience of password locks
y addressing additional needs besides Security such as Stimulatione.g. by making unlocking fun) or Popularity (by having a “cool”
creen lock). There are a few examples for addressing Stimulation
n terms of joy during authentication: related work shows that
or instance gesture-based authentication is able to evoke differ-
nt positive emotional outcomes. Aumi et al. [46] present an au-
hentication system which is based on in-air gestures performed
n the vicinity of a portable device. In a user study they show
hat the gestures’ security is positively correlated with ratings of
leasantness and excitement. Moreover, Karlesky et al. [47] ﬁnd
ull-body gestures for access control to provide a potential for in-
eractions which are perceived pleasurable by users. Popularity in
uthentication mechanisms could be addressed by providing users
ith a “cool” authentication method. For example, Bhagavatula
t al. ﬁnd that ﬁngerprint authentication on smartphones is per-
eived as “cool” [25] . Also, many solutions to improve usability of
nowledge-based authentication methods have been suggested in
he domain of graphical authentication [48] . In graphical authenti-
ation, the password is based on graphical data such as pictures or
cons. It is subject to future research to investigate whether graph-
cal passwords could provide for better need fulﬁllment and a pos-
tive user experience. Furthermore, we plan to investigate in future
tudies how psychological needs such as Stimulation and Popularity
an be systematically addressed in the design of mobile authenti-
ation methods. 
.3.2. Updates 
Participants in the present study mentioned installing updates
o get the newest version of an app. By deﬁnition, experiencing
ew things is associated with the need for Stimulation . However,
his applies only if the new experience is positive. Vaniea et al.
49] observed that users become frustrated when installing up-
ates, if the updates feature new user interfaces which interrupt
he users’ normal workﬂow. Thus, updates are a two-edged sword:
n the one hand they are able to positively surprise users when
ew functionalities or features are added to an app, thus address-
ng the need of Stimulation . On the other hand, users who have had
ad experiences with installing updates may refrain from installing
hem in the future which may lead to security vulnerabilities [49] .
ne option to avoid negative effects on users’ security behavior
s to separate security updates from other updates [50] . Thereby,
n the best case, users will not experience any changes after in-
talling a security update. Nevertheless, it may also be the case,
hat updates just for security purposes are not deployed. Thus, an
pproach based on psychological need fulﬁllment could be to mo-
ivate users to install security updates by connecting these up-
ates with stimulating experiences. For instance, appraisal mes-
ages could be shown or gamiﬁcation approaches could be used
o achieve such experiences. How approaches that address psycho-
ogical needs in update messages could look like in detail, is an
nteresting research question for future studies. 
.3.3. App permissions 
Not only in the present studies, but also in other studies, app
ermissions proved to be hard to understand by some of the par-
icipants (cf. e.g. [7] ). As a consequence, the psychological need
f Competence may be deprived. On the other hand, the present
esults suggest that users appreciate having the possibility to au-
onomously select which permissions they grant (for instance with
espect to location data). Providing users with a clear context to
ake a decision is in any case recommendable [51] . Related work
lso indicates that a clear context supports security-friendly deci-
ions when granting permissions [17,18] . Whether this approach is
lso capable to address users’ need for Competence and inducing
 positive user experience is a subject for future studies. Another
orthwhile topic for future studies is to investigate to which de-
ree run-time permissions (as currently featured in iOS and An-
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 droid 6.0) are perceived as fulﬁlling the need for Autonomy without
being annoying. 
In summary, the interview results illustrate how psychological
needs can be used as high-level primary goals for the explanation
of user behavior and motivation related to security and privacy ac-
tions on smartphones; The interviews and online study results sug-
gest that besides the need for Security , different other needs such
as Keeping the meaningful , Stimulation , Autonomy and Competence
may serve as motivators for security and privacy actions. We con-
clude that the low mean values for need fulﬁllment in the online
survey indicate that security and privacy actions may proﬁt from
new design approaches to support psychological need fulﬁllment
in order to achieve a positive user experience. How different psy-
chological needs can be systematically addressed in the design of
security and privacy technologies on smartphones is an interesting
research topic for future studies. 
8. Conclusion 
We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 19 par-
ticipants to explore the psychological needs that drive security and
privacy actions on smartphones. The results show a variety of self-
reported actions and illustrate how those actions are motivated by
a variety of psychological needs, beyond the need for Security . We
further conducted a quantitative online study with 70 participants
as a ﬁrst attempt to quantify psychological need fulﬁllment for the
employment of security and privacy actions on smartphones. The
results suggest that a variety of psychological needs may motivate
security and privacy actions on smartphones. However, when mea-
sured quantitatively, psychological need fulﬁllment showed to be
rather low. The present work provides examples of security and
privacy technologies that could address psychological need fulﬁll-
ment. The presented studies offer a basis for further conceptual-
izations and for elaborating on the potential that the application
of psychological needs offer in the security and privacy context. 
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